The rational expectations equilibrium (REE) has been criticized as an equilibrium concept in market game environments. Such an equilibrium may not exist generically, or it may introduce unrealistic assumptions about an economic agent's knowledge or computational ability. We define an REE as a probability measure over uncertain states of nature which exploits all available information in a market game, and which exists for almost all economies. Furthermore, if retrading is allowed, it is possible for agents to compute such a 'functional rational expectations equilibrium' using straightforward numerical fixed point algorithms. The approach is demonstrated in a detailed numerical example.
Introduction
The application of the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) concept to market games has not been unambiguously supported by researchers seeking to better understand, and even define, an appropriate equilibrium selection criterion. Indeed, Dubey et al. (1987) criticize the concept of REE in market games (and more generally, in a continuous, anonymous price formation mechanism). They focus instead upon equilibrium selection according to the Nash equilibria (NE) of the market game. While NE are available as solutions either generically (for a continuum of agents), or for an open set (for a finite number of agents), REE cannot be implemented by price formation mechanisms which generate these NE. In addition, research on perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) by Glycopantis et al. (2005 Glycopantis et al. ( , 2009 ) has shown that REE cannot be implemented as PBEs, that they need not be efficient, and are not incentive compatible (either individually or as part of a coalition). 1 Finally, mechanisms which do admit REE (for example, if traders submit their entire demand function to an auctioneer) are argued to be too computationally complex to be realistic.
There is also evidence that NE may generate more realistic time series properties of observed prices than REE. Jackson and Peck (1999) examine an asymmetric information, 2 period market game with an asset and a single consumption good. With an infinite number of agents and no noise traders, they demonstrate that information is not fully revealed in a (Bayesian) NE. Instead, asset prices demonstrate excess volatility relative to the dividend process of the asset. By contrast, REE cannot be obtained by the price formation process.
The difficulty of using the REE concept in market games, as in the examples above, usually hinge upon three main criticisms. First, the definition of REE is circular: the information content of prices is itself used to determine those prices. Second, as initially examined by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and subsequently by many others, REE may fail to exist when all agents are fully informed. In the absence of 'noise' or 'liquidity' traders, markets do not open. Finally, REE may be very difficult to find: if there is any weight to the notion of bounded rationality, it is likely that normal, 'real-world' economic participants will be unable to calculate any REE which might exist.
In this paper, we extend the definition of REE from the usual point representation to one of a 'functional REE ' (Spear 1988; Kelly and Shorish 2000) , in which expectations given by a probability measure of outcomes are self-fulfilling. Starting from a market game environment similar to Jackson and Peck (1999), but with a finite number of agents, a functional relation is defined which links the ex ante expectations of the agents (here, defined by prior probability measures) and the ex post realization after optimization and market clearing, which is also given by a probability measure. When expectations match the result of the economy, i.e. when this functional relation possesses a fixed point, the economy is said to possesses a functional REE: individual agent expectations about the economy's law of motion are fulfilled, and all
